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This thesis examines civilian control of the American
military. It shows that a phobia about losing civilian
control of the military establishment has been caused by the
misinterpretation of two historical experiences, namely: the
American experience of civilian-military relations; and, the
German experience of militarism during the First and Second
World Wars. A description of the United States National
Military Establishment of the twentieth century is included.
Discussion of the American experience covers the early
Constitutional balance, informal elements and cultural
characteristics of the American military, and certain
particularly difficult periods during U.S. history.
Analysis of the German system shows how the German military
was as much subverted from external forces as it was itself
subversive. The conclusion made is that the nature of the
American military is such that excessive fear of military
misuse of power is unwarranted, and that military reform
should be based on this concept.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
The concept of civilian control of the military is so
well assimilated into the American national security system
that it has become an a priori principle, rarely to be
examined in depth and certainly never to be seriously
criticized. Evidence of this is seen in the professional
training and development of United States military officers
who are taught the primacy of civilian control beginning
with their first military indoctrination. This is certainly
in line with the traditional American ambivalence toward
military forces. Generally speaking, many Americans feel
that military force is at best a necessary evil, but that it
must remain under the firm control of the elected civilian
leadership of the country [Ref. 1, p. 4]. Thus, it is not
surprising that this concept be firmly cultivated in the
minds of the members of the military.
The rationalizations for firm civilian control over the
military in a democratic nation such as the United States
are twofold. First is the parallel between policy and
military strategy based on the Clausewitzian concept of
military force as an extension of politics. That is,
because military force is a continuation of a larger
political goal, it follows that military leaders must be
subordinate to civilian political leaders. Second is the
fear that the tool of force will be misused by those
military leaders who, for one reason or another, decide to
act against the higher political goal of the state. In
other words: who will police the police?
The case against firm civilian control manifests itself
in the concept that military leaders can most efficiently
conduct a campaign when not burdened by a civilian
bureaucracy. The question then becomes: How much civilian
control should be imposed on military leaders in the
prosecution of war?
There is no provision in the United States Constitution
for either command or control of the Armed Forces by
civilians who are not directly responsible to the
electorate. Undoubtedly the larger military questions which
have direct impact on the national strategy, economic
health, national goals, the issue of peace or war, or
eventual survival of the nation must ultimately be decided
by constitutional civilian authority. But how far is this
policy to be carried? In a scathing article on the subject
written during the height of the Vietnam War, one civilian
1. Although Clausewitz is clear about the primacy of
political ends over military means, he is less helpful when
it comes to determining the institutional and organizational
arrangements required to ensure that primacy. Clausewitz
does recognize that civilian control over the military does
not automatically guarantee this primacy.
and Naval Reservist pointed out some of the serious
shortcomings of civilian over-control:
Do untrained civilians, working anonymously, have the
right to select the weapon or its fuzing or the number of
weapons by which an approved target may be struck? Should
civilian authority over military matters be extended so
that a commander in the field is told how many pilots he
may use on a raid, or that he must attack only north to
south? Does civilian authority permit an untrained non-
military analyst to decide whether or not a training
aircraft has an ejection seat? Or that the student pilot
needs only "X" hours flight time, vice the "X + 25" hours
the military expert recommends? Should the civilian, who
has no knowledge of aircraft structure, fatigue and stress
analysis, or engineering and flight experience, be allowed
to decide whether an aircraft is safe to fly? Or, whether
an obsolescent model of aircraft should be flown in combat
over North Vietnam? [Ref. 2, p. 28.]
Some sixteen years later, Senator Barry Goldwater
restated the same theme:
What good does it do to train men and women at out
military academies, in our ROTC ' s and officer-candidate
schools, when the knowledge and ability they acquire is
never able to be applied because of the overly burdensome
restrictions impose by the civilians.
Now, I realize as well as anyone that this country
has always respected the supremacy of the civilian over
the military. However, up until the last two wars, the
civilian control has existed in the policy and goals
arena. Until Korea and Vietnam, the professional military
has never been hamstrung by conflicting views and advice
about tactics and strategy by incompetent civilian
managers. [Ref. 3, p. 88.]
A second, and frequently overlooked, argument against
firm civilian control is that the American experience has
shown that, due to intrinsic cultural proclivities, it is
simply not required. American civilization has always
displayed a considerable overlap between civilians and those
2in uniform. From the early concepts of the militiaman and
soldier-citizen to the modern reservist there has always
existed a concept that the soldier is part of "We the
People" rather than something elite or separate. In the
post-World War II era, and particularly since the beginning
of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s, this
characteristic has perhaps become even more salient. The
professional American warrior of today may more often think
of himself as being part civilian while the civilian may be
more aware of concerns which were in the past of a strictly
military nature.
In studying the history of United States civil-military
affairs and comparing it to the stated rationale for today's
National Military Establishment, certain inconsistencies
surface. First, since the constitutional responsibility of
the President of the United States is to be Commander in
Chief of the nation's armed forces, why have his powers to
do so been so effectively eroded by statutory civilian
3bureaucracy, particularly since World War Two? Second,
2. As stated by Morris Janowitz, "Only in the West
[United States] was military service. .. seen as compatible
with the duties and rights of citizenship. In fact,
military service was defined as an integral aspect of
citizenship...." [Ref. 4, pps. 71-72.]
3. For example, why did the National Security Act of
1947 require a Secretary of Defense instead of a
Presidential Deputy; why did the 1949 Amendments place the
newly-created Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under
the Secretary of Defense vice the President; and, why did
the National Security Act of 1958 filter the President's
interface with the uniformed military even further by
10
given that the President is both a civilian and the supreme
commander of the military, why is there such a strong
impulse to continually strengthen civilian control at lower
4levels in the hierarchical structure? Third, given that in
the history of the United States there has never been a case
where the uniformed military questioned or rebelled against
the constitutional authority of the President as Commander
in Chief, why did statute specifically require a general
staff organization (at least for the United States Army)
from 1903 to 1947 while that same general staff organization
was specifically prohibited by law after 1949?
placing the Unified and Specified Commanders under the
Secretary of Defense instead of under the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff?
4. Indeed, why was one of the basic tenants of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986 to, "...strengthen civilian authority in the
Department..."? [Ref. 5, preamble.]
5. Even the worst cases of friction between military
leaders and the President resulted in the maintenance of the
President's ultimate constitutional authority. During the
War Between the States, Northern General-in-Chief George B.
McClellan often expressed his disagreements with President
Lincoln in strong, and frequently insulting terms. But when
President Lincoln summarily relieved McClellan, the General
—who could have seized Washington without opposition
—
accepted the relief without question and ran unsuccessfully
against Lincoln in the next election. [Ref. 6, p. 20.]
In the case of the .disagreements between President
Truman and General Douglas MacArthur, there is little doubt
that the General was incapable of distinguishing between
foreign policy and military operations—the latter being his
only rightful domain. Yet, when Truman made the decision to
relieve him, MacArthur never questioned the President's
Constitutional right to do so. [Ref. 7, pps. 207-210.]
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B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine one
particular aspect of national defense, the concept of
civilian control of the military, and to determine how any
lessons learned may be applied to the current United States
National Military Establishment in the interest of providing
a better national defense. Further, it will be shown that a
phobia about losing civilian control of the uniformed
military has been caused by misinterpretation of two
historical experiences. The first is the misinterpretation
of the American civilian-military experience. The civilian-
military relationship, with all of the sociological,
cultural, and traditional undercurrents, has not been
correctly assessed in evaluating trust and determining the
degree of control required for the American uniformed
military. The second misinterpretation is the German
experience. Failure to properly understand and analyze
Prussian militarism and the German General Staff has
resulted in a misperception by United States policy-makers
that the general staff system itself is inherently flawed
and is not a suitable system for a free society. The
misinterpretation of these two issues has caused the
i
development of an American National Military Establishment
12
so unnecessarily constrained that efficient functioning has
been diminished.
Although the focus of this study is on the United
States National Military Establishment of the twentieth
century, some references must be made to earlier periods.
Chapter II, although not meant to be an in-depth history of
the National Military Establishment, is both historical, and
descriptive in nature.
The major theme itself—the misinterpretation of two
historical experiences— is explored in Chapter III.
Specifically addressed are the issues of constitutional
separation of powers, the checks and balances against a
military dictatorship, affirmation of the nature of the
Presidency being civilian, and the phobia of the general
staff system which was born out of studying the German
General Staff of the twentieth century.
6. It is ironic that a study which suggests that a
reduction in civilian control of the military might be in
order should be undertaken in the wake of the Iran-Contra
scandal. Some soothsayers would indicate that the
overzealousness of Lieutenant Colonel North and Vice Admiral
Poindexter, two dedicated military officers, shows how easy
it is for such misbehavior to be conducted by the uniformed
military and thus justifies an even stronger civilian
control mechanism. Hopefully the more rational observer
will see the case as a failure of policy rather than a
failure of the system.
t
Indeed, the final analysis of
"Irangate" may show that an over-controlled and languorous
bureaucracy may have actually provided the impetus for such
mischief. As well, Poindexter and North, although wearing
uniforms, were serving as part of an institutionally
civilian National Security Council and may have therefore
been in effect not military personnel.
13
The concluding chapter summarizes why the phobia of
military usurpation of power is a myth and points out why
reduction in civilian control over the military is unlikely
to occur. Further, it explores the informal element of the
American military and concludes that the American military
system—with or without a great deal of legislated civilian
control— is not a threat to the free society.
14
II. THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT:
HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF REFORM
A. THE CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
The National Military Establishment as it exists today
is headed by the President and the Secretary of Defense who
constitute the National Command Authorities (NCA) . As
Commander in Chief the president sits at the pinnacle of the
organizational pyramid. The Secretary is available to run
the organization for the President to the degree the
President so desires. Under the Secretary of Defense are
two complementary structures: one administrative and one
operational
.
The administrative side consists of the military
Departments (the Department of the Army, the Department of
the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force) , the defense
agencies, and the largely civilian Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) . By law the military Departments are not
allowed to become involved in operational matters.
Basically, their function is to organize, train, and equip
1. The character of the man who is president is
probably more importartt than the statutory structure of the
organization. A president can use the Secretary of Defense
in whatever capacity suits his style. No two presidents
have been alike in their personalities and decisions on how
to employ their cabinet members. Examples of differences in
style can be found in Refs. 8, 9, & 10.
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forces for assignment to the unified and specified commands
(operational commands) . Each Department is headed by a
civilian Secretary, who supervises the Service Chief (or
Chiefs in the case of the Navy) in matters of a Departmental
nature.
The operational side of the National Military
Establishment consists of unified and specified commands,
each headed by a Commander in Chief (CINC) who reports to
the National Command Authorities. Strictly speaking, the
operational chain of command runs from the NCA through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to each of the CINCs. It is crucially
important to note, however, that, as established by law, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have no command authority. In effect,
the Joint Chiefs provide a channel of communication between
the National Command Authority and the CINCs. Other than
this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff function to prepare
strategic plans and advise the National Command Authorities.
In their role as principal military advisors to the
President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security
Council, and as immediate military staff to the Secretary,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide collective advice and
expertise on all national security matters that may have
military implications.' They do not, as emphasized by law,
act as a general staff over the armed forces.
2. The law is exactingly specific on this subject.
10*USC*155, subsection (e) , which describes the duties,
structure and authority of the Joint Staff, reads as
16
Figure 1 shows how military forces in the field receive
inputs from both sides of the Defense structure.
Operational orders and commands are imposed via Commanders
in Chief of the unified and specified commands. Support and
service oriented requirements and instructions are
administered through the military Departments with their
3Department Secretaries and Service Chiefs.
B. EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT,
1903-1947
Although the National Military Establishment as it
exists today is a direct result of the National Security Act
of 1947, the system actually has roots much deeper.
The first significant "reorganization" of the armed
forces occurred with the passage of the Army Reorganization
Act of 1903. This act marked the beginning of a dichotomy
follows
:
PROHIBITION OF FUNCTIONS AS ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF.
The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as
an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have
no executive authority. The Joint Staff may be organized
and may operate along conventional staff lines. [Emphasis
added.] [Ref. 5, section 201]
3. The Service Chiefs are often said to "wear two
hats". As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they are
responsible for their advisory functions. As the Chiefs of
their military Services, they are responsible to their
Service Secretaries for management of the Services. The
Service Chiefs serve four years. By custom, the Vice Chiefs
of the Services are delegated authority to act for their
Chiefs in most matters having to do with day-to-day




























Figure 1: Organizational Relationships
of the Department of Defense
(Adapted from Ref. 11.)
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between the two historic Services, the Army and the Navy,
which has continued to today.
The 1903 legislation established, in the Army, a
4general staff system. Secretary of War Elihu Root used, as
his chief source of ideas, the German military system. The
system was "line" in nature, with a division between
peacetime and wartime. During peacetime the Army chain of
command ran from the President to the Secretary of War to
the Chief of Staff, and finally to the field commanders.
During wartime the system remained the same except that the
Chief of Staff was bypassed.
The Navy, on the other hand, retained the "line"
concept both during peace and war. The Navy's General Board
was established in a similar vein to the Army's General
Staff (although it was non-statutory) . The General Board,
4. Public Law 57-553 of February 14, 1903 established,
in the Army, a General Staff Corps:
AN ACT TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMY
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United Stated of America assembled,
That there is hereby established a General Staff Corps, to
be composed of officers detailed from the Army at large,
under such rules as may be prescribed by the President.
Section 2. That the duties of the General Staff
Corps shall be to prepare plans for the national defense
and for the mobilization of military forces in time of
war. . . . [Ref . 12
.
]
5. Secretary Root-' s leading assistant on
reorganization, Major William Harding Carter, drafted a list
of specific general staff duties [Ref. 13, p. 333]. It was
essentially a verbatim copy of German Chief of Staff
Schellendorf ' s general staff functions as enumerated in his
book Duties of the General Staff [Ref. 14, p. 204].
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however, was used exclusively as a formal system of counsel
on the overall needs of the Service in the area of war plans
and war preparations and was never placed in a "line" role.
The entry of the United States into the First World War
found the Navy more prepared, both materially and
organizationally, than the Army. Partially as a result, the
established Army's military operations chain of command was
reduced to a direct link between President Woodrow Wilson
and General Pershing, the Commanding General of the American
7Expeditionary Forces. Thus World War I set the mark of
permanency upon the Army General Staff, not for its military
operations, but for its managerial functions. [Ref. 16,
p. 43.]
By 1920 both the Army and the Navy had become committed
to maintaining a post-war status quo where the Service
Secretaries and Service Chiefs of Staff maintained tenuous,
but stable, alliances. These alliances were consolidated in
6. Secretary of the Navy John D. Long authorized the
General Board in 1900. He insisted, however, it not be
given executive authority. Secretary Long undoubtedly
feared that excessive power in the hands of the war planners
would lessen his control. [Ref. 15, pp. 1-22.]
7. President Wilson made little use of the War
Department in military ' functions . He ratified the selection
of General Pershing; he insisted that American troops fight
as organized units in Europe; he took an active part in
wartime diplomacy; and he resisted Congressional efforts to
reduce his authority in the administration of the
governments ' s war activities. [Ref. 16, p. 38.]
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the National Security Act of 1920. It was at this point
that the first talk of Service unification occurred. A
proposal was made in 1921 to place the two armed Services
under a single executive agency, a Department of National
9 . .Defense. Opposition to unification was so strong, however,
that the recommendation was never incorporated.
U.S. entry into World War II found the two Services
organized on much the some principles that had been in
effect at the end of World War I. The need for closer
cooperation by the Services due to a two-front war, and more
significantly, in order to present a unified policy and
strategy front to the British allies, pressured the two
Services toward integration. Thus on December 11, 1941,
President Roosevelt concurred informally in the proposal of
8. The 1920 Act, Public Law 66-227, was actually an
amendment to the more encompassing 1916 Act, Public Law
64-134. The purpose of the "Army Reorganization Act of
1920" was, "An Act for making further and more effectual
provisions for the national defense, and for other
purposes." [Refs. 17 & 18.]
9. Frank Willoughby of the Institute for Government
Research (later, the Brookings Institution) wrote a series
of proposals for reorganizing the federal administration.
These proposals were based upon a business oriented approach
to management and included the military establishment.
[Ref. 16, pp. 87-88.]
10. The Army opposed the reform because it would
replace the Secretary of War with a single civilian
Secretary for the entire Department of National Defense,
thus destroying the Secretary-Service Chief alliance. The
Navy opposed reform because its strategy-oriented identity
as a Service would be jeopardized by the principle that the
Army and the Navy performed a command function. [Ref. 16,
p. 92.]
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his military commanders that they be united in "The United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff." [Ref. 19, p. 15.]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff held their first meeting on
February 9, 1942. For several months afterwards, their
composition varied in response to changes in the
organization of the Army and the Navy. By mid-1942, JCS
membership had become fixed as: the Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army; the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations; The Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces;
and the Chief of Staff to the President. Their task was
to provide strategic advice and direction for the United
States military effort. They advised the President with
respect to war plans and strategy, military relations with
allied nations, the manpower and material needs of the armed
forces, and matters of joint Army-Navy policy. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff was an organization which was to become the
. . . . 12kingpin of unification in the post-war years.
11. Respectively they were General George C. Marshall,
Admiral Ernest J. King, General H. H. Arnold, and Admiral
William D. Leahy. [Ref. 20, p. 3.]
12. The World War II Joint Chiefs of Staff was not the
first attempt at Service "jointness." In 1903 a Joint
Board, consisting of four senior officers from each Service,
was established in an effort to provide a continuing body
which might produce plans for joint operations and resolve
problems of common concern to the two Services. Without any
actual authority, however, the Joint Board accomplished
little and had little or no impact on the First World War.
Although its 1935 publication, Joint Action Board of the
Navy
,
provided some guidance for the unified operations of
World War II, the board itself was not a significant
influence. It was officially disbanded in 1947. [Ref. 11,
22
C. A WATERSHED OF REFORM, 1947-1958
As early as 1943, studies began on the subject of post-
war Service unification of a more permanent and statutory
nature. Before the Congressional Hearings which began in
the fall of 1946, four major studies had been conducted on
military reform, each having significantly different
14
recommendation. Subseguent to the 1946-1947 hearings, the
National Security Act of 1947 was enacted. It marked the
most dramatic turning point in U.S. defense establishment
organization to occur since 1903.
The main purpose of the National Security Act of 1947
was to unify the National Military Establishment and give it
the capability to coordinate individual Service matters.
p. 2-3.]
13. In October, 1943 a report of the Post-War Policy
Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended "a United
States General Staff, with a single Chief of Staff
answerable to the President ," superimposed on the existing
two Departments. [Emphasis added.] [Ref. 16, p. 189.]
14. These studies were the results of : The Woodrum
Committee; The Richardson Committee; The Eberstadt Report;
and The Collins Plan. [Ref. 16, pps. 186-226, & Ref. 19,
pps. 27-49.]
15. Specifically, the purpose of the 1947 Act was:
TO PROMOTE THE NATIONAL SECURITY BY PROVIDING FOR A
NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, which shall be
administered by a Secretary of Defense, and for a
Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a
Department of the Air Force within the National Defense
Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities
of the National Defense Establishment with other
Departments and Agencies of the Government concerned with
the National Security. [Ref. 21.]
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Although the Department of Defense as an organizational
entity was not to be created until two years later, a
Defense Secretary headed the National Military Establishment
and was a member of the President's cabinet (the Service
Secretaries retained their cabinet status as well). Other
key elements of the act included the establishment of the
Department of the Air Force and codification of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff.
Philosophically, the law possessed three critical
elements. First, it rejected the concept of a single
uniformed officer superior to all others. Second, it
prescribed that the Defense Secretary establish general
policies and programs, exercise general direction,
authority, and control, and supervise and coordinate the
preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and
agencies within the National Military Establishment.
Third, the law placed the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the
President and Secretary of Defense and gave them a clear
mandate to provide for the strategic direction of the
military forces.
16. Clearly, the law envisaged the Defense Secretary as
a broad coordinating functionary and not as direct overseer
of the detailed administrative, planning, and applicatory
activities of the several Military Departments or of the
combatant actions of the fighting forces. [Ref. 19, p. 49.]
24
Between 1947 and 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
embroiled in controversy over the missions assigned to the
Services. A compromise—the "Key West Agreement"—helped to
17
clarify JCS authority. Thereafter, it was understood that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for providing
"strategic direction" of the armed forces would include the
"general direction of all combat operations."
The first major modification of the 1947 Act occurred
in 1949. It was a result of difficulties encountered with
both civilian and military organization. On the civilian
side, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal did not possess
the strong degree of authority required to run the defense
establishment. One of the key difficulties was the
competitive nature of the Service Secretaries, all of whom
were Cabinet members. On the military side, the lack of a
permanent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
detrimental to effective and coordinated JCS action.
Clearly "rule by committee" did not work in either the
civilian or uniformed defense organization.
The 1949 revision of the National Security Act greatly
broadened the functions and powers of the Secretary of
Defense while reducing the powers of the Service Secretaries
17. The "Key West Agreement" was a result of
discussions between Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff held at Key West, Florida,
April 26, 1948. The Agreement is printed in Ref. 22, pp.
807 ff.
25
and removing their cabinet status. In addition to defining
the Department of Defense, the 1949 revision also
established a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a
military officer superior to all others, although his power
was still significantly limited.
A key element in the passage of the 1949 Act was
controversy over the civilian control issue. In the
Congressional hearings on the draft legislation there arose
significant opposition to the proposed Chairman. The
opposition was based on fears of a single or "Prussian"
18
chief of staff who would wield excessive power.
The legislation eventually passed, becoming the
"National Security Act Amendments of 1949." The result of
that fears of excessive powers had on the Act becomes
evident by comparing "Section 2—Declaration of Policy" of
the 1947 Act to that same section of the 1949 Amendment.
The 1947 Act reads:
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of
Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future
security of the United States;... to provide for the
effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for
their operation under unified control and for their
integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air
forces. [Ref. 21, Section 2.]
18. For examples of fears expressed during
Congressional hearings regarding the proposed Joint Chiefs
of Staff Chairman, see Ref. 23, pp. 2716-2718, 2733-2736,
2740-2741, 2836-2839, 2847, 2860, & 2873-2874.
26
The 1949 Amendment reads:
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of
Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future
security of the United States; ... to provide for the
effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for
their operation under unified control and for their
integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air
forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over
the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff.
[Emphasis added.] [Ref . 24, Section 2.]
The next major Defense Department reform was to occur
during the early years of the Eisenhower administration.
Dwight D. Eisenhower was dissatisfied with the dual
responsibility of the Service JCS members, as advisors and
planners and as heads of their respective Services. He also
felt the need to strengthen civilian control.
One of his early acts of 1953 was to make non-statutory
changes to the National Military Establishment, particularly
with respect to the roles of JCS members. Under the 1953
plan the Joint Chiefs of Staff were removed from corporate
command responsibility. The line of command was to run from
the President to the Secretary of Defense, thence to the
civilian Secretaries of the military Departments. JCS
members would no longer be designated as executive agents
for the direction of the unified commands. The JCS would
become a planning and advisory body. According to President
Eisenhower, these changes were expected to strengthen
civilian control of the armed forces. [Ref. 25.]
The most sweeping change in National Military
Establishment organization since 1947 occurred with the
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"Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958."
President Eisenhower, during his second term, announced the
new plan as a logical culmination of the unification process
begun in 1947. His reasoning was:
Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone
forever.... Strategic and tactical planning must be
completely unified, combat forces organized into unified
commands. .. singly led and prepared to fight as one,
regardless of Service. The accomplishment of this result
is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised
and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating
under the supervision of the Commander in Chief.
[Ref. 26.]
The 1958 Act absorbed all combat forces into the
unified and specified commands, which were placed under the
immediate direction of the Secretary of Defense. The
Service Departments were taken out of the chain of command
and limited to training, administration, and logistics
roles. The Joint Chiefs were back in the operational
picture but only in the sense that they constituted the
Secretary of Defense's military staff to assist him in
directing the commands. Orders were to be issued by the JCS
under the authority and in the name of the Secretary of
Defense. The actual chain of authority would pass from the
President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs of the
unified and specified commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
from then on, would bear little similarity to the
organization as it existed at the close of the Second World
War.
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Of significant interest in the 1958 Act was addition of
a specific statement on the organization of the Joint Staff.
A subparagraph to a paragraph clarifying the organization
and duties of the Joint Staff reads:
The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as
an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no
executive authority. The Joint Staff may be organized and
may operate along conventional staff lines to support the
JCS in discharging their assigned responsibilities. [Ref.
27, para. 143 (d)
.]
Again the fear of "Prussian" styled militarism impacted the
legislation, just as it had raised its head in the 1949 Act.
Passage of the 1958 legislation set the stage for
successive Secretaries of Defense to remodel the National
Military Establishment without further statutory changes.
The period 1958 to 1986, marked primarily by the turbulence
of the Vietnam War, was significantly influenced by Robert
S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968.
According to one observer McNamara was "A devotee of
quantification ... he surrounded himself with like-minded
people who sought to translate the problems of his office
—
fiscal, development, administrative and operational— into
numerical terms, to the frequent frustration of military
commanders." [Ref. 19, p. 83.] His well-known
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) was developed
in order to more closely relate the defense budget to
strategy. In order to better advance force structuring
proposals of his own, McNamara provided himself with his own
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civilian staff unit, the Office of Systems Analysis,
ultimately headed by an Assistant Secretary. [Ref. 20,
p. 21.]
Like Mr. McNamara himself, many of the non-statutory
changes made during his tenure came under intense criticism.
His lack of practical knowledge of military affairs and
general mistrust of military professionals, coupled with his
unusual acuity, strong conviction, and decisiveness,
resulted in his detailed personal involvement in military
professional matters [Ref. 19, pp. 83-84]. It was during
his tenure that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
became more willing to override the recommendations of the
19Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis of civilian advice.
The policy and procedural changes of the defense
organization, begun under Mr. McNamara and perpetuated by
succeeding administrations, were particularly detrimental to
military organization and command [Ref. 19, p. 101]. It was
not until almost a decade after the end of the Vietnam War,
however, that serious action towards statutory change
designed to correct these problems began to take place.
19. In fairness to Mr. McNamara there were many
deficient areas within the Department of Defense which he
should receive credit f'or correcting. His forte was
primarily in weapons acquisition, budgeting, and systems
analysis techniques and he was responsible for the defense
acquisition process and the Planning Programming and
Budgeting System still in use today. See Ref. 28, pps. 17-
22 and Ref. 29.
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D. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
On February 3, 1982, General David C. Jones, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a hearing before
the House Armed Services Committee, announced his concern
about the basic shortcomings in the organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, his remarks were
amplified by remarks from General Edward C. Meyer, the Army
Chief of Staff, who suggested that the Chairman had not gone
far enough in his recommendations for change. The public
expression of these views by two incumbent members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff renewed serious consideration of the
strengths and weaknesses of the institution of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and eventually led to a much broader
examination of the organizational and procedural problems of
the entire Department of Defense. A multitude of bills were
introduced in both the House of Representatives and the
20Senate concerning Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and between
July 1985 and June 1986 a major study of the defense
establishment was undertaken. This study, conducted by the
21President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,
20. For detailed legislative history see Refs. 30, 31,
32 & 33. For statements of Generals Jones and Meyer see
Ref. 34.
21. The Commission', headed by Mr. David Packard,
consisted of experienced military and civilian defense
experts. The recommendations on military organization and
command were only a part of the final report, which also
included recommendations of Budgeting, Acquisition and
Government-Industry Accountability. [Ref. 35.]
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produced recommendations on military organization and
command which were incorporated into HR 3622. This bill
became Public Law 99-433, the "Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, "on October 1, 1986.
Its purpose was to modify the amended 1947 Act in order:
(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and
strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
(2) to improve the military advice provided to the
President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense;
(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders
of the unified and specified combatant commands for the
accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
(4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders
of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully
commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders
for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their
commands;
(5) to increase attention to the formulation of
strategy and to contingency planning;
(6) to provide for more efficient use of defense
resources;
(7) to improve joint officer management policies;
and
(8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of
military operations and improve the management and
administration of the Department of Defense. [Ref. 5,
section 3.]
The legislation amended title 10 of the United States
Code, providing changes in the principal organizational
elements of the Department of Defense. Title I modified the
authority of the Secretary of Defense to reorganize the
Department of Defense. It also required the Secretary to
conduct a study of the 'functions and organizations of the
22Office of the Secretary of Defense.
22. The study [Ref. 36] was not evaluated in this
thesis.
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Title II contained the most sweeping changes in command
structure. It more specifically defined the role of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in advising the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National
Security Council and in heading the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
as well as gave the Chairman authority over the Joint Staff.
A new position, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, was created and was designated senior to the members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff other than the Chairman. The
bill strengthened the authority and responsibility of the
unified and specified commanders, for example, by giving the
CINCs the power to organize their commands, the power to
select and relieve subordinate commanders, and a greater
input to the annual Defense budget process.
Title IV was designed to improve the quality and
experience of officers serving in joint roles. It
established a new "joint specialty" and delineated specific
requirements that each Service provide a percentage of its
best officers for this role. It also mandated educational
requirements for the joint officers and provides for their
promotions. A critical part of this title was that it
required flag officers to be selected only from the pool of
those who have the joint specialty.
It is enlightening to compare the Goldwater-Nichols Act
to the original reform proposals enumerated by Generals
Jones and Meyer in 1982. In his statement of April 21, 1982
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before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, General Jones recommended five changes
to the National Military Establishment. [Ref. 34,
pps. 58-59.] First, "The Chairman, rather than the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as a body, should be designated the
principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary
of Defense, and the National Security Council." Second,
"The Secretary of Defense or the President would continue to
seek the corporate advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
subjects they deem appropriate." Third, "Each Service Chief
would have the right to submit his individual views and
recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense, and to
the President as appropriate, on any joint issue on which
that Chief had particularly strong feelings." Fourth, "A
Deputy Chairman of four-star rank should be authorized to
assist in carrying out the Chairman's responsibilities."
Fifth, "The Joint Staff should be made responsible directly
to the Chairman rather than to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
a body." Goldwater-Nichols specifically included all five
of General Jones' recommendations.
General Meyer's recommendations on the other hand, made
on the same day at the same hearings, were not as well
incorporated into the bill. Meyer's made six
recommendations. [Ref. 34, p. 6.] First, "Separation of
the Service Chiefs from the day to day operations of the
Joint Staff." This recommendation was only partially
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accomplished, oddly enough, by removing the authority of the
Service Chiefs over the Joint Staff. Second, "Creation of a
separate body of senior officers to deal with the day to day
operational issues as well as the issue of allocation of
resources among Services to create a more balanced
warfighting capability." This recommendation was not
incorporated. In fact, the only existing joint body of
senior officers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was given even
less of a role in resource allocation in deference to the
unified and specified commanders. Third, "Increase the role
of the Chairman. . .as the primary provider of military
advice concerning inter-Service capabilities and
requirements." Goldwater-Nichols did accomplish this
recommendation which was the same as General Jones' first
recommendation. Fourth, "Increased role of unified
commanders in resource determination and allocation and in
development of contingency plans." Again, this proposal was
incorporated at the expense of Joint Chiefs of Staff inputs
in the same arena. Fifth, "Decreased role for civilians
below the level of Secretary of Defense in providing
military input on national security issues." Of all his
proposals, this one was the least accepted. Indeed, just
the opposite was accomplished as evidenced by the policy
statement of the Act itself: "...to reorganize the
Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in
the Department." [Emphasis added.] [Ref. 5, Section 3.]
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The sixth proposal, "Improved role for Service Secretaries
and Service Chiefs in determining organizations, equipment,
and tactics most effective for their Services," was
incorporated into the legislation.
E. CRITICISMS
There remain serious questions about whether the latest
legislation will in fact lead to improvements in the
organization and functioning of the Department of Defense or
whether, in fact, it will make the situation worse. The Act
will produce a significant shift in power and authority.
The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs will lose power;
the CINCs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will
gain it. Still, certain fundamental problems will continue
to plague the National Military Establishment which will not
be corrected by Goldwater-Nichols.
There continues to be an absence of coherent,
consistent, and workable strategic planning and an
inefficient operational chain of command. This results, at
least in part, from micro-management by civilian leadership
below the level of the President. A number of weaknesses in
both the uniformed military and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense require corrections. As pointed out by House
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Armed Services Committee staffer Archie D. Barrett, they
include,
...ineffectual military participation in OSD policy
formulation; insufficient delegation to operating levels
of the Department; imprecise delineation of authority
between OSD and the military Departments; weak evaluation
capability in OSD; inattention to output measures such as
joint warfighting or readiness capabilities in resource
allocation decisions; and absence of cohesion and teamwork
among constituent elements of the Department. [Ref. 37,
p. 52.]
In order to correct these deficiencies the Office of
the Secretary of Defense must be removed from the
professional area of warmaking, which is the proper function
23for the uniformed military. Military plans should be made
by military officers who have the experience and formal
training to conduct such professional military matters. To
complement this the operational command and authority must
pass unimpeded from the President to the fighting forces via
the senior military staff (or, as is presently established,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff) . The role of the civilian
Secretary should be to make the logistic, fiscal, budgetary
and administrative side of the National Military
Establishment work—not to plan or conduct military
operations. What is being suggested is consideration of the
23. The law holds the Secretary of Defense, a civilian
executive, responsible for professional military matters
which, for the most part, are beyond his competence. It is
therefore not surprising that Defense Secretaries frequently
have involved themselves directly with technical military
actions where lives were at risk such as target selection,
troop deployments, or ship dispositions. A multitude of
horrifying examples can be found in Ref. 19, Chapter V.
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return to the General Staff concept; an organizational
system which gives uniformed military professionals the
mandate to plan and conduct war and gives the civilian
defense personnel the responsibility to manage budgets,
procurement and the other business oriented actions required
to support the National Military Establishment.
It is evident, however, that legislators have no
intention of reforming the National Military Establishment
to improve its efficiency and effectiveness as a warfighting
entity by making such a fundamental institutional change.
The bugaboo, the paranoia, which lurks in the minds of anti-
reform advocates is the fear of losing civilian control over
the military forces. As long as this one issue continues to
dominate all discussion and thought on the issue of reform,
it is highly unlikely that any real progress will be made.
Rather, only small, relatively unimportant, shifts, such as
seen in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, will continue to occur at
periodic intervals.
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III. THE HISTORICAL MISINTERPRETATIONS
OF THE NEED FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL
A. THE PHOBIA: ITS CAUSE
Apprehension of losing civilian control over military
forces has been, and continues to be, the dominant topic of
discussion concerning military organizational reform. This
stems mainly from the fear of the possible misuse of
military force. A military force in control of its own
destiny is perceived, and rightly so, as dangerous to a
civilian democratic society. Too much military autonomy
raises all sorts of dread potentials for right-wing coups or
1. For example, in making recommendations to the
Congress on the National Security Act Amendments of 1949,
the Study Commission chairman wrote:
Throughout its history, the United States has been
fearful of military cliques and has thrown up safeguards
against this threat to democratic government. Under the
Constitution, we have subordinated the military to
civilian control by making the President Commander in
Chief of the armed forces, and by installing civilian
secretaries to direct the departments.
...the Nation must make very sure that means of
exercising civilian control are strong and effective. We
repeat, that under these circumstances, we must hold the
military rigidly accountable to the President, the
Congress, and the people. We must do this not only to
safeguard our democratic principles against militarism,
but to ensure that military policy shall be in close
accord with national needs.... [Ref. 38, pp. 2-3.]
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left-wing takeovers. The fundamental American premise has
2
always been civilian control of the military.
In the past four decades, however, the rational and
logical justifications for the primacy of the civilian over
the military have been transformed into a phobia about
losing civilian control. Since World War Two practically
every document, Congressional hearing, book, magazine
article, official government publication, and position paper
on the subject has stated that the principle of civilian
control is fundamental to the safe maintenance of the United
States National Military Establishment.
This phobia has been caused by the misinterpretation of
two historical experiences. The first is the American
civilian-military experience. In assessing the need for
strong civilian control, the tradition of the American
military and its exceptional allegiance to the electorate
and United States Constitution has not been properly
2. The principle of civilian control over the military
in the United States has never been a matter of dispute in
the Republic. Indeed, the principle has been meticulously
observed by top military leaders since June 16, 1775, when
George Washington accepted the appointment by the
Continental Congress to become the Commander in Chief of the
United Colonies. But if the principle and the concept of
civilian control have not been subject to dispute or
controversy, there has been considerable question and
argument over just what is meant by the term "civilian
control," what it encompasses, who are the civilians who
exercise it, and how it is exercised. [Ref. 6.]
3. Based on the author's review of documents listed in
the References and Bibliography sections of this thesis.
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evaluated. Overlooked have been the sociological, cultural,
and traditional factors which have effectuated the flawless
record of loyalty held by the American military.
The second historical misinterpretation comes from the
German experiences during World Wars One and Two. In the
wake of World War Two there has been a failure to properly
understand and analyze the German general staff system and
its associated Prussian militarism. In studying the German
system American policy-makers have developed the incorrect
perception that the general staff system itself is somehow
inherently flawed and is a threat to a free society. This
misconception has been the catalyst for the American
military reform movement which began in 1947 and has
continued to the present. An analysis of these two
experiences shows how the historical misinterpretations are
indeed invalid.
B. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
1. Early History of Civilian Control in the United
States; The Constitutional Balance
The precedent for civilian control in the United
States was the relationship between George Washington and
the Continental Congress. The Congress appointed Washington
Commander in Chief of the Republic but retained, as the
supreme civilian authority, the right to dismiss him.
Washington never forgot that he and the other military men
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of the Republic were the servants to the civilian Congress
and that the ultimate governmental authority lay there. In
the post-Revolution period it was evident to the founding
fathers that it would have been possible for the country to
have emerged from the Revolution as a military dictatorship
had a man different than Washington been Commander in Chief.
[Ref. 6, p. 19.]
The leaders of the revolution and intellectuals of
the time had first hand experience with the misuse of force
by government. They also knew that historically, the ones
controlling the power of the military force could, and
usually did, soon become despots? Oliver Cromwell's power
as Lord Protector of England during the Commonwealth, 1553
4to 1558, being a prime example.
It was thus incumbent upon the writers of the
5Constitution to design a system of checks and balances
which would prevent the usurpation of military power and
4. The Anglo-American tradition of civil-military
relations goes back at least to Oliver Cromwell. Cromwell's
professional army and military dictatorship made a great
impact on British political thinking and subsequently
American thinking. Both have been marked since that time by
an insistence on subordination of the military to the
civilian element of government, as well as an acute
suspicion and rejection, of any proposal for concentration of
military authority that might lead to modification of the
traditional military-civilian relationship. [Ref. 14,
p. 132.]
5. James Madison being one of the most influential and
significant.
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subsequent tyranny by one individual or arm of government.
In order to accomplish this, power was split between the
executive and legislative branches of the government. The
executive branch, centered around the President, was
assigned the responsibility of commanding troops in battle.
In fact, the President was given the title "Commander in
Chief" for precisely this reason. The Constitution also
tasked the executive with the making of foreign policy,
including the negotiations of treaties.
Directly balancing executive power was the
legislature. Congress, although it did not fight wars, was
given the singular responsibility of declaring them. It was
also given the power to pay for them; an even more important
function in prolonged conflicts. In the foreign policy
arena, the legislature, in particular the Senate, was given
the authority to ratify treaties.
The framers of the Constitution felt this division
of power was both necessary and adequate to effectively
defend the United States in war and simultaneously prevent
misuse of military power by a tyrant who might find his way
into the Presidency. It was generally agreed that a
6. This concept is still alive today as evidenced by
Senator Sam Ervin's statement at the Watergate Hearings
that, "One of the great advantages of the three separate
branches of government is that it is difficult to corrupt
all three at the same time." [Ref. 39.]
7. Concerns were expressed in Federalist Papers 24, 26,
29, 41, 49, 67, 69 and others. [Ref. 40.]
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strong, centrally controlled, single minded body was best
suited to conducting foreign relations and war fighting.
The executive branch was therefore designed for this
function; the President being the voice which provided the
requisite control and single mindedness.
The potential for misuse of executive power was
balanced by the powers given to the legislature. It was
recognized that the mechanics of Congress— that is to say,
its multiple opinions and necessity to resolve procedures by
voting
—
prevented its being able to effectively conduct
foreign policy or fight wars. Congress was intended to be a
legislative, not an administrative or executive, body.
2. Bureaucratic Erosion
Failure of this balanced system by Congressional
appropriation of executive branch roles was a concern even
as the ink of the Constitution was drying. How easy would
it be to convert Congress from a legislative to an
administrative body? With uncanny prescience, Thomas
Jefferson was alert to this temptation two centuries ago.
Augmenting Madison's assertion, in The Federalist , that,
"The tendency of republican governments is to an
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aggrandizement of the legislature at the expense of the
other departments," he wrote,
It has been the source of more evil than we have
experienced from any other cause. Nothing is so
embarrassing nor so mischievous, in a great assembly, as
the details of execution... because they in fact place us
as if we had no federal head, by diverting the attention
of that head from great to small objects. [Refs. 40 and
41.]
Were Jefferson alive today be would almost
certainly have mixed emotions about the accuracy of his
prediction. In modern times it is easy to lose sight of the
original balanced design of the Constitution and why it was
designed in such a way. Congressional action in recent
years has eroded executive control over foreign relations
Q
and military security interests in an unprecedented manner.
Even with the erosion of Executive power over the
armed forces that occurred, the military as a whole remained
relatively free from micro-management by civilian
bureaucracy between 1787 and 1947. As was pointed out in
Chapter II, the chain of command between the President and
the operating forces was relatively clear (although layers
were occasionally bypassed) and the Army and the Navy had
8. For example, the National Commitments Resolution,
the Case Amendments and other legislation extending
Congressional control beyond treaties to executive
agreements, the War Powers Resolution, the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment and subsequent acts relating to intelligence
oversight, the Ethics in Government Act (usurping from the
Justice Department the power to prosecute high-ranking
federal officials) , and the proposed Arms Export Reform Act
are some examples of how executive branch Constitutional
powers have been usurped by Congress. [Ref. 41.]
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enough control over their own destinies to retain the
required degree of efficiency without sacrificing their
subservience to the civilian government.
3 . The President as Commander in Chief and a Civilian
Despite bureaucratic erosion, the methods of
execution, control, and checks and balances established by
the U.S. Constitution allowed the nation to flourish and
remain a free and democratic republic. At no point in
United States history has there been any hint of a military
coup or insubordination—even during wartime, the most
9
stressful periods.
The situation as it existed prior to 1947 was
adequate to ensure civilian control. Ultimate executive
authority vested in the President, unquestionably a
civilian. The Constitutional balance opposite the
9. See p. 52.
10. 1947 marks the start of the "watershed of reform"
period beginning with the 1947 National Security Act and
subsequent modifications thereto and culminating the the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. These measures drastically increased
civilian control at the expense of the degree of military
control which had been proven safe to the nation and
necessary for efficient operation of the armed forces
(e.g., by implementing such things as specific prohibition
of the Joint Staff to act as a general staff)
.
11. An opinion by a New York surrogate judge deals
adequately, though not .authoritatively, with the subject of
whether the Presidency' (as Commander in Chief) is a civilian
or a military office. In the Surrogate's Court, Duchess
County, New York, ruling of July 25, 1950, it was determined
that the estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt was not entitled to
tax benefits under sections 421 and 939 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which extended certain tax benefits to persons
dying in the military services of the United States. In
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Executive was retained by Congress, which had control over
appropriations of revenue and to make the rules for the
government and regulation of the armed forces. Civilian
12
control was in tact.
that ruling the surrogate stated:
The President receives his compensation for his
services, rendered as Chief Executive of the Nation, not
for the individual parts of his duties. No part of his
compensation is paid from sums appropriated for the
military or naval forces; and it is equally clear under
the Constitution that the President's duties as Commander
in Chief represents only a part of duties ex officio as
Chief Executive [Article II, sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution] and that the latter' s office is a civil
office. [Article II, section 4 of the Constitution
provides that 'The President, [Vice President] and All
Civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of Treason,
Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'.... The
last two War Presidents, President Wilson and President
Roosevelt, both clearly recognized the civilian nature of
the President's position as Commander in Chief. President
Roosevelt, in his Navy Day Campaign speech at Shibe Park,
Philadelphia, on October 27, 1944, pronounced this
principle as follows:— 'It was due to no accident and no
oversight that the framers of our Constitution put the
command of our armed forces under civilian authority. It
is the duty of the Commander in Chief to appoint the
Secretaries of War and Navy and the Chiefs of Staff.' ...
On the general principle of civilian supremacy over the
military , by virtue of the Constitution, it has recently
been said: 'The supremacy of the civil over the military
is one of our great heritages.' Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 324
U.S. 833 (1945), 14 L.W. 4205 at page 4210."
[Ref. 42, pp. 466-467.]
12. In saying this the term "civilian control" is
finally defined in its purest, unadulterated from. Civilian
control over the armed .forces of the United States is the
practice of the Constitutional provisions that the armed
forces are commanded by the President—a civilian—and that
they are organized, equipped and supplied as directed by the
Congress— a body of civilians. It means nothing more nor
less than that. [Ref. 6.]
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The fact is that the Army, organized since 1904
using the general staff system modeled after the German
system, did not threaten civilian control . Nor was
civilian control lessened by the absence of a huge
bureaucratic—and mostly civilian—Office of the Secretary
of Defense. In fact, in the entire history of the United
States, there has not been one single case where military
leaders usurped, attempted to overthrow, or challenged the
authority of the duly elected Constitutional civilian
authority.
a. Lincoln and his Generals
Abraham Lincoln was acutely aware of the
political threat posed by various Union generals during the
War Between the States. The tangled intrigues and
machinations of men like McClellan, Butler, and Fremont were
crucial not only for his own survival as president but for
the maintenance of civilian control as well. This was true
in late 1862 and early 1863 when rumors circulated
concerning the dictatorial designs of Generals McClellan and
Hooker.
During the war General-in-Chief George B.
McClellan often expressed his disagreements with President
Lincoln in strong, and< 'frequently insulting terms. But when
13. The Army's general staff organization did not
challenge civilian supremacy as evidenced by the absence of
a single example of unconstitutional usurpation of power by
the Army during this period.
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Lincoln summarily relieved McClellan, the General—who could
have seized Washington without opposition—accepted the
relief without question. The Democrats nominated McClellan
for President, but Lincoln, aided by important Union
victories, easily defeated him. [Ref. 43.]
This example illustrates how Lincoln was
challenged constitutionally and how unconstitutional
usurpation of power by the military—even in an intense
14
case—did not occur.
14. In United States history the best example of
unconstitutional misuse of military force was not done by a
uniformed military officer but by a civilian President.
Abraham Lincoln, at the beginning of the War Between the
States in 1861, took unto himself powers far beyond any ever
claimed by a Chief Executive:
In late April, for security reasons, he authorized
simultaneous raids on every telegraph office in the
northern states, seizing the originals and copies of all
telegrams sent or received during the past year. As a
result of this and other measures, sometimes on no
stronger evidence than the suspicions of an informer
nursing a grudge, men were taken from their homes in the
dead of night, thrown into dungeons, and held without
explanation or communication with the outside world.
Writs of habeas corpus were denied, including those issued
by the Supreme Court of the United States. By the same
authority, or in the absence of it, he took millions from
the treasury and handed them to private individuals,
instructing them to act as purchasing agents for procuring
the implements of war at home and abroad. In early May,
following the call for 75,000 militiamen, still without
Congressional sanction, he issued a proclamation
increasing the regular army by more that 20,000, the navy
by 18,000, and authorizing 42,034 three-year volunteers.
[Ref. 44, p. 67.]
Lincoln was challenged constitutionally by military
officers, however. Lincoln was acutely aware of the
political threat posed by various Union generals during the
War. The tangled intrigues and machinations of men like
McClellan, Butler, and Fremont were crucial not only for his
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b. Truman and MacArthur
A contemporary example of the strength of the
president against military assumptions of power is the
firing of General Douglas MacArthur. In prosecuting the
Korean War, MacArthur was dissatisfied with the limits
placed on his military objectives. Eventually he began to
complain publicly and relations between his headquarters and
the White House grew more and more strained.
The situation drew to a head in March of 1951
when MacArthur, acting contrary to the president's
preparations for truce negotiations, issued his own
invitation and ultimatum.
Truman viewed this insubordination as
unpardonable and exercise his Constitutional powers,
relieving MacArthur of his commands. In the eyes of the
public this act was a glaring controversy, stemming both
from the fact that MacArthur was a hero of two generations
and from the question of civil-military relations. The
General never challenged the authority of the Commander in
own survival as president but for the maintenance of
civilian control as well. This was true in late 1862 and
early 1863 when rumors circulated concerning the dictatorial
designs of Generals McClellan and Hooker. The political
situation reached its n'adir in 1864 when Lincoln admitted
that the greatest threat to his reelection would come from a
general. The Democrats nominated McClellan, but Lincoln,
aided by important Union victories, easily defeated him. In
his political struggles against his generals, Lincoln
displayed superior ability as a strategist. [Ref. 43.]
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Chief to relieve him, however, and the primacy of civilian
control by the president was maintained. [Ref. 7 , pp. 199-
210.]
4
. Lessons Learned from the American Experience
The United States Constitution, with its checks
and balances, has provided a basis for civil-military
relations which inherently opposes military usurpation of
power. Even with the occurrence of certain erosions of
Executive branch power, the primacy of the civilian over the
military has been retained.
Historical examples demonstrate how, even in the
most severe cases— such as those faced by Lincoln and
Truman—the Constitutional power of the president has never
been challenged. As well, legal judgments have shown that
the president is himself unquestionably civilian in nature.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, military
seizure of power in the United States is not now, nor ever
15has been, in the character of the American military
Throughout the Nation's history there has been little danger
15. Much has been written in the fields of military
psychology and military sociology to support this claim.
Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U.S. Navy )Retired), states,
"...we in the United States by our political and moral
philosophy are committed to the furtherment of freedom."
Eccles concludes that the concept of freedom is paramount
and is an inherent characteristic of the American military.
[Ref. 45, p. 19.]
Morris Janowitz shows how American soldiers have been,
"...citizens rather than 'mere' subjects,..." and makes a
similar conclusion of American military character. [Ref. 4,
p. 71.]
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of a military uprising in the United States because of the
very nature of the military people themselves. This
character was emphasized in the report from the Senate
Committee on Armed Services on legislation which become the
National Security Act of 1947. The report stated:
The committee sees no danger of militarism in this
unity of executive authority over the National Security
Organization. Such fears are groundless. The safeguard
against militarism in this country is not to be found in
the costly confusion and inefficiency of uncoordinated
executive agencies with confused lines of authority. It
abides rather in the solid conviction of our people, and
the basic democratic principle., that the leaders of the
armed forces are subordinate to their civilian heads, and
through them to the President, the Congress, and the
people. Concentration of authority over the armed forces
in a single civilian under the President, as provided for
in this bill, will no more foster militarism than
concentration of that authority in the President has
fostered militarism throughout our national history.
[Ref. 46, p. 16.]
More recently, this same characteristic was
reiterated by Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan) , one who
certainly cannot be considered a military "hawk." On the
Senate floor during debate over the Goldwater-Nichols Act,
he stated:
This country has been blessed with a professional
military who have accepted, observed, cherished the
concept of civilian control. Through bad times and good,
the military have never threatened this Republic. I
cannot imagine that they ever will. [Ref. 47, pp. 14-15.]
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C. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE
In the United States, the change in the degree of
civilian control/ which began in 1947, was ironically not a
result of problems experienced within the United States'
military establishment. Rather, it resulted from study of
the late nineteenth and twentieth century German military
system which occurred in the wake of the Second World War.
Policy analysts and military planners inspecting the German
military system in the twentieth century identified what was
1
6
believed to be severe threats to democratic government.
They saw lack of civilian control as the primary
16. Probably the best evidence of these concepts can be
found in the hearings which preceded the National Security
Act of 1947. For example, in testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman,
United States Navy, stated:
An outstanding example of the antithesis of the
American system was the German armed forces organization
under Hitler '"s armed forces high command, which he
created in 1939 in anticipation of World War II.
The German organization was designed for
authoritarian control in which rigid lines of authority
would proceed direct from a supreme commander to and
within operating units.
...This system was very costly of men but was
designed for the authoritarian control which the German
High Command sought, regardless of its flexibility....
It is needless for me to point out that an
"organization of the armed forces representing the most
logical and efficient solution for an authoritarian state"
would not be the most efficient solution for the [American
armed forces.] [Ref. 48, p. 179.]
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contributor, if not the cause, for German entry in to both
World Wars.
1. German Political-Military Affairs in World War One
The initiation of World War One has been
attributed, at least in part, to the German General Staff's
strategic plans. The Triple Entente between Russia, France,
and Great Britain threatened Germany with enemies on both
the eastern and western borders and thus established the
potential for a two-front war. In response to this threat
the German General Staff developed a plan for fighting on
18two fronts—the Schlieffen plan. Expectations of how the
war would break out led the General Staff to plan
irreversible military acts which left the civilian
minister's hands tied. [Ref. 49, p. 56.] As well, the
necessities of military planning demanded attacks on France
17. James Joll, in his book describing the origins of
World War One, goes so far as to state, "...the most
important aspect of the role of the German army in the
coming of war was its freedom from civilian political
control." [Ref. 49, p. 61.] It is apparent that Joll
attributes Germany's responsibility for the war, at least in
part, to German militarism.
18. The Schlieffen Plan, named after the Chief of Staff
at the time it was developed in 1905, General Alfred Graf
von Schlieffen, called for a rapid "one-two punch" against
France and Russia. In order to achieve a rapid victory over
France, the German armies were to move through Belgium and
the Netherlands so as to cross the French frontier where
fortifications were weakest and thus envelope the French
armies and eventually surround Paris. With France quickly
defeated, German forces could then be concentrated in the
east to destroy the Russian army as it slowly attempted to
mobilize. [Ref. 49, pp. 40 & 83.]
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(even though the war was initiated by Russia in support of
Serbia) and the violation of Belgium and The Netherlands.
[Ref. 50, p. 44.]
The key point here is that the Schlieffen plan
significantly locked the German politico-military machine
into a pre-determined course of action. The German
ambassador to Russia recognized this during the 1914 crisis
when he said, "...once the button is pressed and the
machinery of mobilization set in motion there is no stopping
it." [Ref. 51.] Once it started, the freedom of action of
the civilian ministers was limited by the strategic plans
and decisions of the General Staff [Ref. 49, p. 7]. The
Kaiser himself, however, did not learn the limits of his
power until his Chief of Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, told him
that to conduct a concentrated assault on Russia without
first attacking France per the Schlieffen plan would leave
his entire army in disarray [Ref. 49, p. 22].
As the Great War progressed, control of Germany's
military machine grew stronger and eventually appeared to
develop a will of its own. The Kaiser's reaction to
military losses in 1916 was to appoint General Paul von
Hindenburg, as chief of staff, and General Erich von
Ludendorff, as first quartermaster general, to a virtual
dictatorship [Ref. 52, p. 118]. Ultimately, Germany ceased
to be in any sense a civilian empire on January 9, 1917 when
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg surrendered to the demand which
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he had resisted for three years, to wage unrestricted
submarine warfare. Thereafter the admirals and Ludendorff
were in charge. [Ref. 53, p. 107.]
The lesson perceived from the history of the
German military system in World War One was that the modern
German nation was, in one sense, the creation of Prussian
militarism [Ref. 53, p. 118]. To cure this ill the Treaty
of Versailles was to dissolve the brain and nerve center of
the army, the German General Staff [Ref. 54, p. 18]
.
2. Versailles, the Inner-War Years, and World War Two
Until 1918, Germany was able to block what was
considered in the west to be the minimum requirement for
representative government, namely, the principle of
ministerial responsibility and effective parliamentary
control over state administration and policy. After the
signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the adoption of the
Weimar republic the German army had to accept, for the first
time in its long history, a civilian minister of war
[Ref. 55, pp. xiv & xviii] . The new structure was of small
impact, however. The military establishment that remained
distanced itself from civilian culture during the Weimar
period. The German army, in fact, created "a state within a
state." [Ref. 52, p. 141.] Such a system was well
established by the time the republic had ripened for Adolf
Hitler's right-wing subversion in 1933.
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This is not meant to imply that authority over the
military forces of Germany at once came to Hitler. The
reality was quite the contrary. In fact, as late as 1938,
General Hermann Goering tried himself to secure control of
the army but Hitler prevented it; his argument being that
such a concentration of power would have been too great
[Ref. 54, p. 74]. In retrospect it is easy to recognize
that Hitler really meant such a concentration of power, in
someone other that himself, would have been too great.
Germany in the 1930s may not have been as much a
case of the military complex subverting civilian control as
it was a case of the civilian leader, Hitler, subverting the
military. Hitler allowed the armed services to retain their
professional independence until the late 1930s but then
moved gradually and insidiously to undermine military
authority until he eventually reduced the General Staff and
German Army headquarters to mere technical duties and
usurped their responsibilities for decision and command in
19his own person. For the professional officer corps the
19. According to Bell:
. . . the evidence is that Hitler did not proceed from
calculations of military preparedness, still less from the
advice of the General Staff, but from his own convictions
as to what the army should be made ready to do [Ref. 54,
p. 194].
Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that,
contrary to what one would expect, it was Hitler, not the
army or the General Staff, who conceptualized Blitzkrieg
[Ref. 52, p. 163]
.
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Hitlerian period was marked by a long series of humiliations
[Ref. 55, p. xix] . After the 1939 Czechoslovakian coup it
was rare that Hitler would allow recommendations made by
20
military advisors to supersede his own preferences.
3 . Lessons Learned from the German Experience
The German Experience during the first half of the
twentieth century shows examples, not of military usurpation
of power, but of the dilemmas of foreign and domestic
policies and political subversion. The inability of German
politicians to maintain a Bismarck-styled balance of power
in the early twentieth century may have placed German
military planners in such a situation that the Schlieffen
Plan was the only, or at least the best, way to a safe
defense. It is incorrect to place the entire blame on the
military planners for developing plans in the shadow of a
foreign policy incompatible with the political security of
the German state.
Consequently, it is difficult to see how the
military system was responsible for dragging Germany into
20. In explaining the Munich conference, Bell states:
The reluctance of the Czechs to opt for almost
certain suicide by triggering off a general war may be
readily understood. It was Hitler's last-minute refusals
to take the risk of war, and to opt instead for the lesser
gain from a conference, which was surprising. Counsels of
caution, both from the professional soldiers and from
Goering, prevailed. Hitler later came to regret his
decision, and was determined not to repeat it over Poland
in 1939. [Ref. 54, pp. 242-243.]
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the Second World War when, in fact, Hitler, a civilian, had
subverted both the Weimar Constitution and the high command
and, at least by the late 1930s, was making strategic
21
military decisions himself.
As the examples show, the absence of civilian
command below the level of the Kaiser did not cause the
First World War, nor did Hitler's civilian nature prevent
subversion of the legitimate German administration
(including the military itself) . The German military, with
its excellent general staff system, was not the cause of
German aggression in either the First or the Second World
War. Rather, the strong, centrally-controlled military
force topped by a professional general staff which had
operational control allowed greater security and flexibility
to the government's executive.
D. THE PHOBIA: ITS EFFECT
Upon reviewing the American civil-military experience
it becomes clear that military usurpation of power in the
United States has never been a problem. Such action would
21. According to Brian Bond:
Hitler allowed the armed services to retain their
professional independence until the latter 1930s but then
moved gradually and insidiously to undermine their
authority until he eventually reduced the general staff
and army headquarters to mere technical duties and usurped
their responsibilities for decision and command in his own
person. [Ref. 52, p. 158.]
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be contrary to the cultural, sociological and traditional
characteristics involved in American civil-military
relations. Further, by inspecting the German experience, it
becomes increasingly curious why the need for reform in the
direction of more civilian control has been deemed necessary
in the post-World War Two period.
As pointed out in Chapter II, military power,
cohesiveness , and organization have been deliberately and
steadily undermined, starting in 1947 and continuing to the
present. Specific prohibitions against general staff
organization, increased powers of appointed civilian
officials, and confusion over operational and administrative
roles have all been conducted in the interest of solving a
problem the United States has never had.
It is true that skepticism in the dialog on the part of
the American people and their leaders as to how best to
prevent the misuse of military power is unquestionably
healthy and necessary in ensuring the maintenance of a free
society. When that skepticism turns to unwarranted anxiety
and phobia of militarism, however, that dialog can easily
become detrimental to the very security of the nation. By
22
overreacting, beginning in 1947, to a situation which
22. That "overreaction" being the parts of the 1947
National Security Act and subsequent modifications thereto
including the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These measures
drastically increased civilian control at the expense of the
degree of military control which had been proven safe to the
nation and necessary for efficient operation of the armed
forces (e.g., by implementing such things as specific
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developed in Germany under an entirely different set of
circumstances and by failing to correctly assess the
American experience on its own merits, the security of the
United States has been actually reduced with a less
efficient military force which is micro-managed by civilians
at not one, but many, layers in the military hierarchy.
There is little doubt that the impact of these
historical misinterpretations will continue to be far
23
reaching. Given the nature of the American political
system, reform to allow a general staff system and lessen
prohibition of the Joint Staff to act as a general staff)
.
23. For example, even the debate concerning the most
recent legislation focuses on the German experience.
Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan) , in a May 7, 1986 statement
on the Senate floor concerning the bill which was to become
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, said:
Some with little knowledge of this bill and less
knowledge of history may declare that we have created a
general staff similar to that of the Prussian and German
general staffs. We have not. The German staff was not an
organizational phenomenon. The German general staff,
which was not a national military staff, was a creation of
the German Army. Through a highly competitive process
officers were selected and trained as members of the
general staff. Their careers were monitored and developed
separately from the large majority of the officers in the
German Army. They were the elite of the German Army.
Whether one approves or disapproves of this procedure, we
have not created such/an elite corps of officers in our
military. Officers assigned to Joint Staff positions
whether in Washington or elsewhere will be assigned by
their parent services from among all the officers




civilian "over-control" is unlikely to occur. Even if it
does, however, the American military, due to informal, non-
statutory elements, will continue to be an institution which
is not a threat to the free democratic republic. These
elements—the unlikelihood of real reform and the informal
element of the American military—will be addressed in the
concluding chapter.
24. A statement by Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia)
emphasizes this point:
The concept of civilian control of the military is
firmly ingrained in our Defense Establishment.
Nevertheless, the committee [on Armed Services] was very
careful to recommend only changes [to the National
Security Organization] that would either preserve or
strengthen civilian control. [Ref. 56, p. S 5474.]
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V. CONCLUSION
A. THE MYTH DESTROYED
In studying the history and development of the National
Military Establishment and the concept of civilian control
certain key points have been developed. First, in a free
society military power must be subordinate to political
purpose. The usurpation of power by the military must not
be allowed to occur. Second, the Constitution of the United
States establishes civilian control of the military by
appointing the President Commander in Chief of all military
forces. Third, there is no question that the Presidency is
a civilian post. Fourth, the United States Constitution
prevents usurpation and misuse of military power by
balancing the executive role in operating the military
forces with the legislature's role in funding the forces and
declaring war. Fifth, although there have frequently been
frictions, there has never been a case in the history of the
United States where the uniformed military has challenged
the Constitutional authority of the civilian President over
the armed forces. Sixth, a general staff system of military
organization does not threaten the Constitutional authority
of the President as Commander in Chief, nor does it threaten
the role of Congress in appropriating funds or declaring
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war. The War Department successfully operated using a
General Staff from 1903 to 1947 without ever usurping
Constitutional authority. Seventh, the wrong lesson was
learned from studying the German example. The German
General Staff system did not fail the German political
system. Rather, just the opposite occurred.
From a reasonable consideration of these points it
seems that there is little foundation for arguments against
a more streamlined National Military Establishment with a
uniformed military operational chain of command which
reports directly to the President. There also seems to be
little rational evidence against a proven general staff
system. Furthermore, it has been shown that the phobia
about losing civilian control of military power in the
United States is unfounded—that the historical experiences
of the United States should go far in countering the myth of
military usurpation of power.
B. WHY CHANGE IS UNLIKELY IN A NUCLEAR WORLD
The probability is low that civilian control within the
United States National Military Establishment will be
reduced. This is primarily due to the change in the nature
of warfare since World' War Two. The availability of weapons
of mass destruction means the probability of all-out global
war has been reduced while the limited application of
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military force to obtain certain limited political
objectives is greater that ever before. The Korean conflict
and particularly the war in Vietnam demonstrate this concept
of limited, or undeclared, war.
Political leaders understand that military officers
have traditionally seen their role more in terms of
defending the continental United States against aggression
than in advancing political goals throughout the world.
1. In two separate essays, author Barbara W. Tuchman
summarizes how the goals and purposes of the United States
military have changed since World War Two. In an article in
the New York Times in 1972, Tuchman explains why war is no
longer unrestricted:
Contrary to the general impression, nuclear fire
power, because it is too lethal to use, has reduced, not
enlarged, the scope of war, with the secondary and rather
sinister result that while unlimited war is out, limited
war is in, not as a last resort in the old-fashioned way,
but as the regular, on-going support of policy.
This development means that the military arm will be
used more for political and ideological ends than in the
past, and that because of chronic commitment and the self-
multiplying business of deterrence and a global strategy
of preparedness for two and a half wars—or whatever is
this week's figure—the technological, industrial, and
governmental foundations for this enterprise have become
so gigantic, extended, and pervasive that they affect
every act of government and consequently all our lives.
[Ref. 57, p. 262.]
In a subsequent address to the United States Army War
College, Tuchman hits upon the key element which has been
displaced in our politico-military system today—what is the
legitimate purpose of the military? She states:
In short, the mission of the military in this
sociopolitical era is to be counter-revolutionary,
otherwise the thwarting of communism or, if euphemism is
preferred, nation-building, Vietnamizing, or perhaps
Pakistanizing or Africanizing some willing or unwilling
client. This is quite a change from defense of the
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Those political leaders, therefore, clearly recognize the
need for absolute control over the military if such
political goals are to be brought to fruition. A strong
uniformed chain of command under a strong Commander in Chief
could be a threat to the limited conflict interventionist
policies of many United States leaders today. Indeed,
debacles such as Vietnam would be much less likely without
2
strong civilian control. After all, what uniformed
military officer would support going into battle knowing
3that the object was something other than to win? The
change in style of warfighting— from all-out war to limited
conflicts—then, has made strong civilian control at many
levels within the hierarchy an even more desirable system.
continental United States which the founders intended
should be our military's function. [Ref. 58, p. 282.]
2. Retired Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC
goes so far as to essentially blame the Vietnam debacle on a
single civilian—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.
See "Growth of a Gargantua." [Ref. 19, pp. 81-104.]
3. Evidence of the reluctance to fight wars not meant
to be won is not limited to the uniformed military. In a
1986 article in Foreign Affairs magazine, Secretary of
Defense Casper Weinberger outlined six "tests" for
determining whether military force should be employed. The
second test listed by Weinberger was,
-Should the United States decide that it is necessary
to commit its forces* to combat, we must commit them in
sufficient numbers and with sufficient support to win. If
we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources
necessary to achieve our objectives, or if the objective
is not important enough so that we must achieve it, we
should not commit our forces. [Ref. 59, p. 686.]
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With this strong urge for greater control there is little
chance that efforts to reduce civilian control will have any
success
.
C. THE INFORMAL ELEMENT
Although reduction in civilian control might not be
convenient to interventionist policies in a limited-conflict
world, it certainly would not be dangerous to the
maintenance of America as a free and democratic republic.
In addition to the Constitutional and traditional elements
which ensure civilian control, the informal, or non-
statutory, element of the American military would also
continue to keep its power in check.
This informal element is the product of several
American characteristics. One is the traditional openness
of the American military. The source of the men in uniform
4is American society—an open and self-critical society.
This helps the military itself to remain open.
4. Granted this element may not always be consistent.
The military draft of the Vietnam era used as its source
primarily the lower socio-economic stratum of society. Now,
with the all-volunteer, force, the military draws on a
different segment of the population to fill its ranks.
Nevertheless, in general and subjective terms, and compared
to other nations, the American military draws people from,
and returns them to, an open civilian society. This must
have a positive affect on keeping the military itself open.
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Another American institution is the "fourth" branch of
government— the press. Although the press has always had
impact on American policy and use of military force, its
impact has been particularly strong since World War Two.
This is due to increased technological sophistication which
allows events in the field to be reported on almost
instantaneously. The press had a far reaching impact on
United States actions in Korea and Vietnam simply through
rapid reporting of events and the subsequent capability to
provide a critical forum for discussing ongoing operations.
Additionally, the use of television during the Vietnam
conflict made daily events part of the average American's
evening news. Just as the press has been a check on the
political forces of the nation, it has also become a check
on military power as well.
A third American characteristic is the highly developed
military-industrial complex. A technologically
sophisticated interwoven fabric of cooperation between the
military users and the industrial suppliers provides a
balance in power stronger than that which could be imposed
from an external source such as legislation. Part of this
fabric is the result of increased commerce of officers
5. Morris Janowitz points out that technological
developments have, "...had the effect of 'civilianizing
'
military institutions and of blurring the distinction
between the civilian and the military." [Ref. 60, p. 34.]
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between the uniformed military and the civilian think tanks
which has developed since World War Two. As a result, many
of those civilians who are providing guidance on military
issues understand the military mind, the problems of the
uniformed military, and the best methods of preventing
creeping militarism. Likewise, the uniformed military
(particularly the officer corps) see their own future
personal livelihood in terms of defense-related civilian
employment. Consequently, they do not want to see develop
a system where only the uniformed military have authority
and control.
D. CONCLUSION: THE AMERICAN MILITARY—NOT A THREAT TO THE
FREE SOCIETY
The informal element, along with the Constitutional
formal element previously described, are adequate to ensure
that military power in the United States will remain
6. As pointed out by Albert D. Biderman in his essay
"Sequels to a Military Career: The Retired Military
Professional :
"
The role of retired U.S. military personnel in
civilian life raises broader questions now than in the
past. As compared with any previous time, there are
presently far more retired military men with far greater
involvement in more non-military pursuits for greater
proportions of their lives. [Ref. 61, p. 287.]
The result is that greater numbers of former military
men will be pursuing second careers in defense related
fields.
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subservient to national policy goals and objectives. It is
not necessary to permeate the military hierarchy with
civilian control by legislation. Reform of the defense
establishment—whether it be the re-establishment of a
general staff or other such change—should proceed from this
realization in order to provide for the most effective
defense of the nation.
Military seizure of power in the United States is not
now, nor ever has been, in the character of the American
military. Throughout the Nation's history there has been
little danger of a military uprising in the United States
because of the very nature of the military people
themselves. The concept of civilian control of the military
is firmly ingrained in the United States military
establishment—not because of any particular statute, but
because of the character of the people who make up the
defense establishment. It has been this way since the days
of George Washington, has survived the times of men like
McClellan and MacArthur, and is as strong as ever in today's
nuclear age. The people who make up the defense
establishment realize, as they always have, that they are
not an elite and segregated group. Rather, they understand
that they are first and' foremost citizens of the United
States and apply that understanding in their service to the
nation.
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As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General John W. Vessey, U.S. Army, stated in an address to
the 1984 Naval War College class:
...our military, springing from the society it serves and
is sworn to defend, embodies the principles that govern
the society. We, the military, are a part of "We the
people." That is why our military forces have never
produced a man on horseback; why the military forces have
not been involved in the political affairs of the nation;
and, why they have not strayed form the narrow path of
defending the Constitution as it was originally
intended—that is, protecting the society and not policing
the society. [Ref. 62, pp. 14-15.]
The American military will, as it always has, carry out its
duties to the Constitution, the American people, and those
officials who have been elected to lead.
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